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DID THE BUDDHA BELIEVE IN KARMA AND REBIRTH?* 
(published in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 21(1), 1998, pp. 1-19) 
 
The title of this lecture may raise some questions. Before we can even try to answer the 
question whether the Buddha believed in karma and rebirth, we have to address a few 
other ones. One is whether karma and rebirth necessarily form a couple. We will see 
that not all scholars have looked upon these elements in this way, and that some have 
suggested that the Buddha may have believed in only one of these two. 
 An equally important question concerns the issue whether philological research 
can ever hope to find out anything about the historical Buddha.1 Isn't it safer to say that 
the early Buddhist texts inform us about the views and beliefs of the, or a, Buddhist 
community during some period? And if philological analysis allows us to reach further 
back into the past (supposing it can actually do so), does this not merely lead us back to 
an earlier phase of the views and beliefs of the, or a, Buddhist community? Is it not, 
therefore, wiser to speak about early — or even: earliest — Buddhism, and leave the 
Buddha out of the picture? 
 In earlier publications I was not quite certain about this issue, and had a 
tendency to speak about early or earliest Buddhism, rather than about the historical 
Buddha.2 But closer reflection suggests that this attempt to express oneself carefully 
may really have the opposite effect. The texts on which we base our conclusions — 
primarily the SËtras — claim to present [2] the teachings of the Buddha.3 They may be 
right or wrong in this, and probably they are partly right and partly wrong, but they do 
not even pretend to inform us, except perhaps in passing, about the beliefs and practices 
of the early Buddhists. Some modern scholars try to reach conclusions about early 
Buddhism — i.e. about the beliefs and practices of the early Buddhists, not including 
the Buddha himself — on the basis of other materials, such as early Mahåyåna sources. 
One example is the public lecture delivered here in Kyoto a few years ago by Paul 
                                                
* Slightly modified text of a lecture delivered at Ryukoku University (Kyoto) in November 1997. I thank 
Esho Mikogami and Fumio Enomoto, as well as other members of the audience, for a challenging and 
fruitful discussion. 
1 Some scholars may feel that the very wish to do so betrays "positivist concerns for origins" (see, e.g., 
Hallisey, 1995: 36). They should perhaps be reminded that within Buddhist studies the study of the 
Buddha and his views holds a legitimate position, as legitimate as the study of the views of Dharmak¥rti 
or, indeed, of T.W. Rhys Davids. 
2 Other scholars did and do the same; see, e.g., such titles as The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early 
Buddhism (Vetter, 1988), "On the annihilation of karman in early Buddhism" (Enomoto, 1989), etc. 
3 This appears also to be Richard Gombrich's opinion (1993: 146), who "assumes that the oldest texts do 
reflect what the Buddha said; all I shall say about that here is that it is a defensible assumption and in any 
case a necessary one if we are to ascribe any views to the Buddha at all." 
DID THE BUDDHA BELIEVE IN KARMA AND REBIRTH  2 
 
 
Harrison, which was subsequently published in the journal of Otani University.4 
Harrison criticizes the view according to which Gautama the Buddha became 
progressively deified with time, and prefers to think that he may have become a virtual 
god even during his own lifetime, and ascribed with miraculous powers and 
superhuman status by his adoring devotees. Harrison may very well be correct in this, 
but it seems evident that the early texts we possess say relatively little about these early 
Buddhists, and a great deal more about the person they adored, Gautama the Buddha, 
and his teaching. If, therefore, philological analysis of the early Buddhist texts can teach 
us something about the earliest phases of Buddhism, then most probably they can teach 
us more about the historical Buddha and his views than about the beliefs and practices 
of the earliest Buddhists.5 False modesty seems therefore out of place, and I will speak 
of the Buddha in cases where I think that the texts allow us to reach back to the times 
they claim to describe. 
 This bold decision should not, however, make us reckless. The claim that the 
early Buddhist texts may tell us something about the historical Buddha and his views 
does not imply that they will provide us with many reliable details about the beginnings 
of his career. Whether we fully agree with Harrison or not, it seems more than likely 
that the Buddha was held in extremely high esteem by his followers at the time of his 
death. It is hard to doubt that they did what they could to remember his words and ideas, 
i.e., the words and ideas of the years not too long before his disappearance. But I find it 
hard to imagine that [3] these same devotees knew and memorized the words and views 
of their teacher some forty years earlier (supposing that the traditional information 
about the life of the Buddha is more or less correct), when he was still more or less 
unknown. There are admittedly contradictions in the old SËtras, but there are other ways 
to account for them rather than seeing in them earlier views of the Buddha himself, and 
these ways seem to me infinitely more plausible. 
 Yet certain scholars claim to have information about earlier views of the 
Buddha, which he then supposedly modified later. Frauwallner's attempts to distinguish 
phases in the life and teachings of the Buddha are particularly well known.6 Some other 
scholars, too, think that it is possible to reach conclusions about the Buddha's early 
views, even about karma and rebirth. Tilmann Vetter, in his article "Das Erwachen des 
Buddha", argues that the Buddha at first sought, and realized, the ‘death-less’ (amata / 
am®ta), which is concerned with the here and now. Only after this realization, when he 
had already started preaching this discovery, did he supposedly become intimately 
                                                
4 Harrison, 1995. 
5 I am aware that some scholars will consider this "sociologically naïve" (cp. Pyysiäinen, 1996: 108). 
6 Frauwallner, 1953: esp. pp. 178, 186, 197, 213. 
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acquainted with the doctrine of rebirth held in certain ascetic circles.7 This position 
contrasts strongly with the one Vetter expressed in an earlier publication. There we 
read:8 "The Buddhist doctrine of salvation ... seems firmly bound to the concept that 
one must continuously be reborn and die. If there is no rebirth, then one needs no path 
to salvation, because an end to suffering comes at death." Why did Vetter change his 
mind? 
 Vetter has come to attach particular importance to the text which is traditionally 
considered to contain the first sermon of the Buddha. In this first sermon initially the 
eightfold path is taught, and only subsequently — and in some versions of the text not 
at all — the Four Noble Truths. In an earlier publication I drew from this the following 
conclusion:9 "This seems to indicate that initially those Four Noble Truths were not part 
of the sermon in Benares, and consequently probably not [4] as central to Buddhism as 
they came to be. We may surmise that the concise formulation of the teaching of the 
Buddha in the shape of the Four Noble Truths had not yet come into being, not 
necessarily that the contents of this teaching deviated from what they were meant to 
express." In other words, the particularities of the text can be explained with the help of 
some simple assumptions about the constitution and preservation of the tradition, most 
probably after the death of the Buddha. Vetter, as we have seen, prefers to explain these 
same particularities with the help of some altogether different assumptions pertaining to 
developments in the life of the historical Buddha. 
 Let me, to conclude this section, recall that Vetter does not stand alone in 
thinking that karma and rebirth, though accepted by the Buddha at some point of his 
life, are not essential to his doctrine. Another scholar who does not believe that rebirth 
was a necessary tenet of the teaching of the Buddha is Akira Hirakawa. He adds, 
however, that Íåkyamuni did not reject rebirth, "because the belief in rebirth is one of 
the most important tenets of Indian religion". He then goes on: "Íåkyamuni was 
primarily concerned with liberation from the suffering of existence. If existence 
consisted of cycles of birth and death, then deliverance from those cycles was his goal. 
Thus Early Buddhists did not need to dismiss rebirth."10 
 
                                                
7 Vetter (1996: 54) supposes, "dass der Buddha erst nach der Realisierung und Verkündigung des schon 
hier und jetzt ... zu erreichenden ‘Todlosen’ (amata / am®ta) mit der in bestimmten Asketenkreisen 
lebenden Wiedergeburtslehre bekannt wurde oder sich mit ihr erst dann wirklich auseinandersetzte, 
nachdem er sie früher, wann immer er von ihr hörte, nie ernst genommen hatte"; so Vetter, 1996a: 7; 
1997: 42. 
8 Vetter, 1988: XVI. 
9 Bronkhorst, 1993: 107 ([101]). 
10 Hirakawa, 1990: 6. 
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 Not all scholars are ready to follow Frauwallner and Vetter in their attempts to 
distinguish between succeeding views held by the Buddha in the course of his life. 
Many rather try to distinguish between views held by the Buddha and those introduced 
by his followers. I sympathize with this approach, and consider its chances of success 
greater than the attempt to trace the development of thought of the Buddha during his 
lifetime. This is not to say that it is easy to identify the views of the Buddha in the early 
texts. The many different opinions that have been expressed during the last century or 
so on the original teaching of the Buddha should make us extremely cautious, also in 
this endeavor. Here we must concentrate on some efforts that have been made to 
identify the views of the Buddha on karma and rebirth. 
 There is a tendency among some scholars to expect that the views of the Buddha 
on karma and rebirth should be close to the archaic views known from other early 
Indian sources. Such other sources we possess in [5] the texts of the Veda, and in the 
Jaina canon. Passages in the early Buddhist texts that are more or less similar to what 
we find in these other texts inform us, according to this line of reasoning, about the 
earliest form of the doctrine of karma and rebirth in Buddhism. 
 In this connection we must first deal with Tilmann Vetter's The Ideas and 
Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism, published in 1988.11 The author tries to 
reconstruct the Buddha's views on rebirth in the light of beliefs found in Vedic texts. 
Referring to a paper by Michael Witzel,12 Vetter points out: "The most ancient places 
found in the Vedas where rebirth is mentioned show only a belief in the other world ... 
After a stay in heaven a person is reborn as a human being, preferably in his own 
family" (p. 78). By contrasting ancient Buddhism with these Vedic sources, Vetter 
believes that he can establish "that according to ancient Buddhism good deeds lead to 
heaven and bad deeds to the underworld" (p. 77). How does he establish this? 
 On p. 79 Vetter refers to SN 3.21, which he calls "the sutta on light and 
darkness". It still reflects, according to Vetter, "the old structure that good or bad 
conduct in the world of mankind leads either to heaven or to the underworld". A brief 
summary of the contents of the sutta is meant to show this. It reads:13 
 
There are four kinds of persons (puggala); one who from the darkness goes to 
the darkness, one who from the darkness goes to the light, one who from the 
light goes to the darkness, and one who from the light goes to the light. The 
person who from the darkness goes to the darkness is reborn (paccåjåto) in a 
lower class family of Caˆ∂ålas, basket makers, hunters, etc., in a poor family 
                                                
11 Vetter does not withdraw his earlier views in his most recent publications, so we must assume that he 
takes it for granted that the Buddha, when at last he became acquainted with the doctrine of rebirth, 
accepted it in the form presented in this book. 
12 Witzel, 1984. 
13 Vetter, 1988: 79-80. 
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with little food and clothing; moreover the person is ugly and a cripple. And this 
person leads an evil life with his body, his speech and his thoughts and after 
death he goes to the underworld. The person who from the darkness goes to the 
light is also reborn in a lower class family of Caˆ∂ålas, etc., is ugly and a 
cripple, but leads a good life with his body, his speech, and his thoughts and 
after death goes to the heavenly world. The person who from the light goes to 
the darkness is reborn in an upper class family of wealthy warriors, Brahmans, 
or citizens where there are all the luxuries of life; moreover the person is 
beautiful. This person leads an evil life with his body, his speech and his 
thoughts, and after death he goes to the underworld. Finally, the person who 
from the light goes to [6] the light is reborn in an upper class family of wealthy 
warriors, Brahmans or citizens where there are all the luxuries of life; moreover 
the person is beautiful. This person leads a good life with his body, his speech, 
and his thought and after death he goes to the heavenly world. 
 
How is this passage supposed to establish Vetter's thesis to the extent that "according to 
ancient Buddhism good deeds lead to heaven and bad deeds to the underworld"? Sure, 
they can lead there, too, but personally I would be extremely hesitant to conclude from 
some such passage that they can only lead there. I find it very plausible that in such 
discussions particular forms of rebirth may be highlighted, occasionally even to the 
exclusion of other forms of rebirth, depending of the particular point this or that sermon 
is intended to make.14 Is there any other evidence in support of the thesis that heaven 
and the underworld are the only destinations at death? 
 Vetter continues on the same page 80 with the words: "Passages in the canon 
which mention the ‘divine eye’ are also grounds for assuming that in the earliest period 
the idea of karma was only connected with heaven and the underworld and not with a 
future human existence" (my emphasis, JB). Unfortunately for Vetter, the ‘divine eye’ 
passages do not prove much, and Vetter is honest enough to show into what quandary 
they get him. Consider the following passage from his book:15 
 
The divine eye is identical to the second of the two types of knowledge which in 
the detailed description of the dhyåna path have been inserted between the 
attainment of the fourth stage of dhyåna and the realization of the four noble 
truths. This second type of knowledge is described (cf. e.g. MN 27, I p. 183) as 
follows (abridged): 
 
"With (his) divine eye he sees creatures disappearing and reappearing, 
the lowly and the exalted, beautiful and ugly, with a blessed existence or 
a miserable existence. He understands that they return in accordance with 
their deeds. Some creatures do evil with their body, their speech and their 
thoughts. They condemn the noble (ariya), they have wrong views and 
conduct themselves [conformable to these] wrong views; after death they 
                                                
14 One is here reminded of the statement attributed to Íå†yåyani in Jaimin¥ya Upani∑ad Bråhmaˆa 3.5.9.5 
(ed. B.R. Sharma): "This world is much afflicted with disease. But they talk and exert themselves out of 
love for that [other world] (i.e., heaven). Who would do away with that [other world] and come back 
here?" 
15 Vetter, 1988: 82-83. 
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reappear in the underworld. But other creatures do good with their body, 
their speech and their thoughts. They do not condemn the noble, they 
have the right views and conduct themselves [conformable to these] right 
views; after death they reappear in the heavenly world" 
[7] 
The theoreticians of the dhyåna path thought that also a remembrance of one's 
former existences belonged to the enlightenment and release of the Buddha and 
his better disciples. But the formula of the remembrance of former existences, 
which is perhaps also very old but comes from a different source, does not 
mention a heaven and an underworld, nor karmic retribution, it is only 
concerned with rebirth in the world of man. It states (e.g. in MN I p. 22, 
abridged): 
 
"I remember one former existence, two, three, ... ten, twenty, thirty, ... a 
hundred, a thousand, a hundred thousand, numerous aeons in which the 
world approaches destruction, numerous aeons in which the world 
expands ... There I had this name, belonged to this family, this caste, had 
this livelihood, experienced this happiness and sorrow, lived so long; 
having disappeared from there I reappeared here, had this name ..." 
 
What conclusions should one draw from this situation? Of two supposedly very old 
passages one only mentions the underworld and the heavenly world, the other one "is 
only concerned with rebirth in the world of man". Vetter's own comment is (p. 83): 
"The juxtaposition of the two formulas allowed persons to mentally combine them and 
read in them what they expected to find there, namely that the quality of human 
existence is also the effect of karma." But this avoids the issue. If we assume, with 
Vetter, that the two passages are in contradiction, the preference for one of the two as 
representing the position of ancient Buddhism, or even of the Buddha, is purely 
subjective. But there is no reason to see a contradiction between the two. The fact that 
one concentrates on heaven and the underworld, and the other on human existences, 
may indicate that the doctrine of rebirth was given interpretations that fitted the 
situation, or the mood of the speaker. But both passages fit in with a general concept of 
karma and rebirth which concerns existences both among human beings and in heaven 
and the underworld.16 
 The supposition that the doctrine of rebirth was given interpretations that fitted 
the situation, or the mood of the speaker, seems to find confirmation in the 
circumstance, emphasized by Lambert Schmithausen (1992: 138), that "in the Aßokan 
inscriptions, there is no mention of rebirth as an animal or preta nor even of a return to 
the world of men, nor is there any instance of rebirth or transmigration terminology. 
The only thing we find is that ... Aßoka contrasts, with this world, the yonder [8] world 
..., and that he seems to equate the yonder world more or less with heaven ... which will 
                                                
16 Interestingly, Vetter ascribes this position to the later years of the Buddha (1988: 83): "... some 
developments may be expected within the long lifetime of the Buddha, especially that differences in 
human existence are explained by karma ... and that after death one does not always go to heaven or the 
underworld, but that one becomes directly a human being if one has no extremely good or bad karma." 
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be attained by those who zealously practise his dhaµma, i.e. moral behaviour." 
Schmithausen comments: "Provided that the information the inscriptions yield on 
Aßoka's view on man's destiny after death is tolerably complete, this view doubtless 
looks fairly archaic. In so far as it does not mention an underworld or hell as a place 
where evil-doers go after death, nor return from heaven to the human world, it clearly 
looks even more archaic than what appears to be the oldest rebirth theory in the 
Buddhist canon." This last remark — about "what appears to be the oldest rebirth theory 
in the Buddhist canon" — refers to Vetter's views which we have been discussing. But 
Schmithausen's suggestion about Aßoka can be dealt with in the same way as Vetter's 
views about early Buddhism. Schmithausen himself observes (p. 139): "[Aßoka's] 
silence may be understandable if these ideas were, in his time, not, or not yet, current or 
prominent in certain circles (e.g., Brahmanism, or among k∑atriyas, or common people) 
and hence ignored by him in favour of a kind of common denominator, or if he himself, 
and perhaps even (some or most?) lay Buddhists at his time, still stuck to a view closer 
to the Vedic or k∑atriyac one than to those documented by the Buddhist canon." One 
would like to add that Aßoka's silence may be equally understandable if he, or some or 
most Buddhists at his time, preferred to concentrate their efforts on rebirth in heaven, 
rather than occupying themselves with all the other possible forms of rebirth, without, 
for that matter, rejecting the belief in those other forms of rebirth. 
 Let us now return to Vetter's views about earliest Buddhism. Beyond the 
arguments just discussed, no further ones are given, as far as I can see, in support of the 
view "that good deeds lead to heaven and bad deeds to the underworld". And if I 
evaluate the situation correctly, by far the most important argument in support of this 
view is precisely the one according to which "[t]he most ancient places found in the 
Vedas where rebirth is mentioned show only a belief in the other world". The situation 
of the Buddha is evidently looked upon as a development of the one found in the 
earliest relevant Vedic texts. Since the early Vedic passages show only a belief in the 
other world, passages in the Buddhist canon that remotely suggest the same must 
somehow, so Vetter, belong to earliest Buddhism. 
 This is of course a dangerous procedure to follow. The tendency to look for the 
origin of the theory of karma and rebirth in the Veda, once [9] popular, is being 
severely criticized these days.17 Moreover, one should not confuse Vedic passages that 
show a belief in the return of a person in his own family, with those other ones that 
show acquaintance with the theory of karma and rebirth. The former belief is very wide-
spread indeed. It is attested in ethnographic literature pertaining to all the continents, 
and its presence in Vedic literature is hardly remarkable. Whether there is a historical 
                                                
17 Bodewitz, 1992; 1993; 1996; 1996a; Bronkhorst, 1993a. See further Schmithausen, 1995: 49 f. 
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connection between this belief and the theory of karma and rebirth is far from obvious, 
and has not so far been shown. 
 We can, and must, conclude that the evidence in support of the theory that in 
early Buddhism "good deeds lead to heaven and bad deeds to the underworld" and 
nowhere else is extremely precarious. Let us now consider the views of another scholar 
who has applied a similar method. This scholar is Fumio Enomoto. His article called 
"On the annihilation of karman in early Buddhism" (1989) begins with the following 
reflections:18 
 
As is well known, early Buddhism and early Jainism have common aspects. 
Comparing the practice of the former with that of the latter, however, we find a 
radical difference between them. The main point of Jaina practice is to annihilate 
karman (action and latent substance left behind by it, which produces effect), 
while that of [the] Buddhist one is to annihilate kleßa (mental defilement). The 
idea of karman and transmigration appeared already in the early Upani∑ads, 
which are thought to have been composed before the formation of Buddhism and 
Jainism. We see many descriptions of how one transmigrates according to his 
own karman in the literatures of early Buddhism as well as of early Jainism. 
Jaina practice to emancipate from this transmigration fundamentally consists of 
making no new karman and eliminating hitherto accumulated karman 
accordingly. However, Buddhist practice would be the annihilation of kleßa, but 
not of karman. This seems to reflect the view whose explicit expression is found 
in ... later Buddhist literature ... Then did early Buddhism have no idea of the 
elimination or annihilation of karman? 
 
This question determines the subsequent development of the paper and, I dare say, its 
outcome. The first and main conclusion is (p. 55): "karman is to be shaken off in 
Buddhism as well as in the early Upani∑ads and Jainism." The justification of this 
conclusion is one rather short section, the main statements of which are (p. 44-45): 
[10] 
Making an exhaustive investigation on the occur[r]ence of the word karman 
(kamma) in early Buddhist literature, we find some descriptions which show the 
elimination of karman. One of them is found in the Udåna ...3.1, where a 
mendicant who eliminates hitherto made karman is described in verse. 
... 
The idea of shaking off karman or the like is expressed in the literatures of the 
early Upani∑ads and Jainism. ... Thus this verse of the Udåna includes the ideas 
which are common with the early Upani∑ads and Jainism. 
 
I do not know whether Enomoto has any further evidence than only this verse from the 
Udåna; he certainly does not refer to it in this section. He only adds a footnote which 
shows that the reading of the crucial word kamma in the verse is not guaranteed: other 
versions evidently had kåma. This, of course, weakens his position even further. 
                                                
18 Enomoto, 1989: 43-44. 
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 One has the strong impression that Enomoto is not really bothered by this lack 
of evidence. His main argument is evidently that this idea occurs in the Upani∑ads and 
Jaina literature, and that it therefore must have been part of early Buddhism. 
 Strengthened by this conclusion, Enomoto draws some other ones, on equally 
slender textual evidence. His fifth conclusion, in particular, deserves our attention. Here 
Enomoto cites the following passage from the A∫guttara Nikåya (p. 52): 
 
so navañ ca kammaµ na karoti, puråˆañ ca kammaµ phussa phussa 
vyantikaroti, sandi††hikå nijjarå akålikå ehipassikå opanayikå paccattaµ 




He makes no new karman and annihilates former karman, experiencing (its 
retribution) successively. Such is (the way of) wearing out (karman) which is 
visible in this life, takes no time, is what one is to come and see, leads onwards 
(to the Goal) and is to be known by the intelligent each for himself. 
 
Enomoto then comments: 
 
The word nijjarå (nirjarå) is a technical term of Jaina practice and indicates the 
annihilation of karman, which also appears in the preceding passage of the 
introduction of Jaina practice. This word appearing here in Buddhist practice 
would also indicate the same. The practice "He makes no new karman and 
annihilates former karman" also is almost the same as the Jaina practice ... 
introduced in the preceding passage. However, the way of the annihilation is 
different. This is enabled by shaking of karman itself in early Jaina practice, but 
by the successive experience of the retribution of karman with the three 
fundamental stages (i.e., ß¥la, samådhi and prajñå, JB) in this Buddhist practice 
as the expression "experiencing (its retribution) successively" shows. 
[11] 
The conclusion is easy to anticipate (p. 55): "karman may be annihilated by the 
successive experience of its retribution with the three fundamental stages of Buddhist 
practice." Once again, one isolated passage from the early SËtra-Pi†aka is deemed to be 
sufficient to justify a conclusion about early Buddhism; the fact that there is a close 
similarity with early Jainism is apparently considered a supporting factor.19 
 
 The opinions which we have considered so far share one common feature. The 
scholars concerned apparently believe that traces of the teachings of the Buddha, or of 
earliest Buddhism if you like, can only be found in passages that do not fit in well with 
the generally recognized canonical points of view. Many earlier scholars, too, have 
                                                
19 The idea of annihilation of karman through the experience its painful results is elsewhere in the 
Buddhist canon attributed to the Jainas; see Bronkhorst, 1993: 26 f. 
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started from this assumption, and they have produced an impressive collection of 
mutually differing views about earliest Buddhism.20 Can we really expect to make any 
progress in this direction? I would think not. 
 Equally useless seems to me the postulate that earliest Buddhism — i.e., the 
teaching of the Buddha — must have been more or less identical with what we find in 
the relevant Vedic and Jaina texts. Much of what we find in the early Buddhist texts 
evidently deviates quite considerably from those ancient sources. This must then 
represent later developments within Buddhism. How are these developments to be 
explained? Do we have to conclude that the Buddha — who claimed to have a new 
message — had really nothing new to say, whereas his early followers — who claimed 
to preserve the teachings of their master — could not restrain their originality? Is this 
not putting things on their head? Of course new developments may have taken place 
after the death of the Buddha, and I think it is undeniable that they have. But admitting 
this is not the same as practically denying that the Buddha had anything new to say by 
reducing his teachings, as far as the texts possibly allow, to something more or less 
identical with what we find in certain Vedic and Jaina texts. 
[12] 
 This is not to deny that there are passages in the Buddhist canon that are very 
similar to ideas current among non-Buddhists of the time. But rather than concluding 
that they, and only they, represent earliest Buddhism, while all the rest was made by 
monks, it is precisely these passages whose presence in the Buddhist canon can be most 
easily explained on the assumption that they are not part of earliest Buddhism. They 
may have been borrowed from the other currents which scholars like Enomoto have so 
carefully identified. 
 More generally, I would like to propose two simple methodological rules. In the 
first place, in order to find the teachings of the Buddha, we should look for ideas that 
are most clearly distinct from the other currents of that time that we know of, rather 
than different from generally recognized Buddhist canonical views. Secondly, rather 
than rejecting beforehand the whole canon with the only exception of one's few favorite 
passages, I propose to reject more parsimoniously: in principle the canon preserves the 
teachings of the Buddha, but in practice certain ideas and practices presented in it have 
to be discarded for specifiable reasons. 
 These rules have of course to be handled with great care. I will not enter into a 
discussion of the theoretical and practical difficulties involved, but rather turn directly 
                                                
20 It is somewhat surprising that Chr. Lindtner (1997: 113) considers it "unfortunate that the debate about 
precanonical Buddhism ... has ... largely been discontinued". Lindtner himself makes some suggestions 
about "precanonical Buddhism" in which similarity with Vedic views is treated as supporting evidence 
(e.g. pp. 117, 135 f.). 
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to the question that concerns us here: What was the Buddha's attitude with regard to 
karma and rebirth? 
 Our first methodological rule leaves no doubt as to the answer. Enomoto started 
his article with the observation concerning the radical difference between early 
Buddhism and early Jainism. His methodological approach looked upon this situation as 
problematic. Our first methodological rule, on the other hand, sees in it supporting 
evidence that possibly the Buddhist textual tradition has here preserved an original 
element of the Buddha's teaching. Contrary to other movements of that time, the 
Buddha did not consider physical activity to be the cause of rebirth, but rather the 
intention behind it. Numerous passages about the importance of ‘thirst’ (t®∑ˆå) are in 
agreement with this view. Thirst is close to intention, in that it can express itself in 
physical activity, but is clearly distinct from it.21 
[13] 
 Lambert Schmithausen (1986: 205 ff.) has once raised the question whether 
karma already played a role in the theory of rebirth of early Buddhism. Schmithausen 
recognizes the acceptance of rebirth at this early period, but wonders whether karma 
played a decisive role in it. In support of this reflection he points at the frequent 
mention of thirst in the early texts. I have already explained that Schmithausen's 
question seems justified to me. But instead of speculating about a completely different 
view of rebirth which supposedly characterized the teachings of the Buddha, it seems to 
me more than sufficient to conclude the obvious: that the Buddha interpreted karma 
differently; not as just physical activity, but rather as the mental attitudes (intention, 
desire, etc.) behind it. 
 
 I have so far presented two positions, two different approaches, with regard to 
karma and rebirth in early Buddhism. I shall now present what seems to me crucial 
further evidence supporting the position I have been defending. This position does not 
only do more justice to the main body of the texts — this we have seen. In addition it 
enables us to explain the presence of a great number of deviating passages in the texts, 
including the ones which Enomoto used as evidence for his theory. Since I have dealt 
with these issues already in some recent publications, I cannot enter into details.22 But 
nor do I need to, for my central argument is very simple. 
                                                
21 Such a point of view is not entirely unknown to early non-Buddhist literature; cp. B®h-Up 4.4.6 f. 
(with kåma), where Vetter (1996: 54 n. 20) suspects Buddhist influence. The Jaina SËyaga∂a (2.6.27 f.) 
expresses its disgust at the Buddhist position, which might even justify cannibalism: "If a savage puts a 
man on a spit and roasts him, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary ... he will not be guilty of 
murder according to our views ... that will be a meal fit for Buddhas to feast on" (Bollée, 1974: 28). 
22 Bronkhorst, 1993; 1995. 
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 Many of the contemporaries of the Buddha looked upon karma as physical and 
mental activity.23 This karma was believed to determine one's future life. Many of those 
contemporaries did not want a future life. How could they avoid it? Two types of 
solution are known from the literature, both of which depend crucially on the concept of 
karma as physical and mental activity. Rebirth could be avoided by not acting, 
physically as well as mentally. This aim was accomplished — or at least efforts were 
made in that direction — in two ways. Some, most notably the Jainas (but not only 
they) practised asceticism which focused on bodily and mental immobility. The 
discomfort these practices entailed were looked upon as the results of earlier actions 
which disappeared by giving rise in this way to retributive experience. Once freed from 
these [14] earlier actions, physical and mental motionlessness until death could 
guarantee final liberation. 
 Besides these ascetics, there were those who believed that the real self does not 
participate in the actions of body or mind. Identification with those actions is therefore 
essentially based upon a mistake, a misunderstanding concerning one's true nature. 
Insight into the true, inactive, nature of the self is the remedy for these thinkers, and I 
do not need to remind you that this conviction is widely represented indeed in Indian 
thought. 
 Note again that both these solutions depend vitally on a certain concept of 
karma. Karma has to be physical and mental activity, and not (or not primarily) the 
intentions behind it. This is particularly clear in the case of the ascetic practices tending 
towards immobility. They are attempts to stop physical and mental activity. The belief 
in a by nature inactive self, too, is clearly related to the view that activity brings about 
the results one wishes to avoid. The Buddha, however, had a different concept of 
karma. Not physical and mental activities as such, but intentions and desires were for 
him responsible for rebirth. This means that neither of the two solutions discussed could 
possibly be acceptable to him. Both of them are indeed criticized in the early Buddhist 
texts. The Jaina way of immobilization is ridiculed, and the idea that insight into the 
true nature of the self could lead to liberation is rejected. His problem, contrary to that 
of his contemporaries, was psychological, so his solution had to be psychological as 
well. And indeed, the early Buddhist texts contain descriptions of the path to liberation 
which are not attempts to immobilize the body and the mind, but which concern 
psychological processes, the exact nature of which it is difficult to evaluate. I think here 
in the first place of the long description centering on mindfulness and culminating in the 
so-called Four Dhyånas and liberation through a liberating insight. 
                                                
23 Johnson (1995: 11 ff.) and following him Dundas (1997: 504) emphasise Jainism's original denial of 
the validity of intention in defining an action. 
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 My main point so far is that the Buddha's path to liberation was essentially 
different from that of his contemporaries, because his concept of karma was different 
from theirs. I do not know whether he was the only one in his time to think of karma in 
this way. It seems however certain that his followers kept having difficulties accepting 
this different concept of karma. This I conclude from the fact that practices and ideas 
related to the other concept of karma keep on popping up within the Buddhist tradition. 
Interestingly, such practices and ideas are often presented as correct at one place in the 
early texts, and criticized and [15] rejected at another. Examples have been discussed in 
the earlier publications referred to, and only some illustrations will be taken from them. 
 "A SËtra of the Majjhima Nikåya (the CËÒadukkhakkhandha Sutta) and its 
parallels in Chinese translation describe and criticise the Jainas as practising 
‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’ and ‘non-performing of new actions’. 
This can be accepted as an accurate description of the practices of the Jainas. But 
several other SËtras of the Buddhist canon put almost the same words in the mouth of 
the Buddha, who here approves of these practices."24 This practice — a form of which 
Enomoto considered to belong to earliest Buddhism, as we have seen — clearly is of 
the kind that we may call "inactivity asceticism". It cannot be excluded that the form 
adopted by at least some Buddhists distinguished itself in some details from the form 
accepted by the Jainas (as Enomoto maintains), but even in this adapted form it 
corresponds to a concept of karma which was not that of the Buddha. 
 For certain non-Buddhists, insight into the true nature of the real self served the 
purpose of ending the mistaken identification with one's actions, as we have seen. The 
allegedly first sermon of the Buddha accomplishes the same aim, using an amazing 
device. It supposedly ended the first monks' mistaken identification with their actions, 
not with the help of a doctrine of the self, but with a doctrine of the not-self: since none 
of the constituents of a person are his self, he turns away from them; "turning away he 
is dispassionate; through dispassion he is freed; in the freed one the knowledge comes 
to be: ‘I am freed’, and he knows: Birth has been destroyed, the pure life has been lived, 
what was to be done has been done, so that there is no more return here".25 
 In the most recent of the earlier publications mentioned above I also pointed out 
that practices and ideas corresponding to the non-Buddhist concept of karma continued 
to exert an attraction on the Buddhists, even long after the days of "early Buddhism".26 I 
there drew attention to the practice of physical inactivity advocated by the Chinese 
master called Mahåyåna in the 8th century in Tibet, and to the tathågatagarbha doctrine 
                                                
24 Bronkhorst, 1995: 334-35. 
25 Bronkhorst, 1995: 344. 
26 Bronkhorst, 1995: 346-47. 
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in Mahåyåna Buddhism, which is so close to the idea of an inactive self that even some 
Buddhist texts draw attention to it. 
[16] 
 I consider all these cases supplementary evidence (if evidence was needed) 
supporting the position that Buddhism — and this means in this case no doubt: the 
Buddha — introduced a concept of karma that differed considerably from the 
commonly held views of his time. Let me specify, in order to avoid misunderstanding, 
that I do not wish to state categorically that no contemporary of the Buddha shared his 
concept of karma (how could I know?), and nor do I wish to claim that in later periods 
only the Buddhists accepted it. 
 
 Let us return to the subject-matter of this lecture: Did the Buddha believe in 
karma and rebirth? The answer, in so far as the texts allow us to reach an answer, seems 
to me an unambiguous ‘yes’. The Buddha did believe in rebirth, and he did believe that 
one's future destiny is determined by what we may call karma, but which is in some 
essential respects different from what his contemporaries meant by it. For the Buddha, 
one's future destiny is determined by what passes in one's mind, i.e., by desires and 
intentions.27 And there is no reason to think that this future destiny consisted for him 
exclusively of heaven and underworld. 
 One last question: How do we explain that the Buddha's concept of karma, i.e. 
of the factors that determine the details of one's future life, differed in such an essential 
manner from commonly held views in his time? Here, I would think, one can only 
speculate. It is possible that he inherited this conviction from others, perhaps from his 
parents. Or, and this is a possibility that cannot be discarded offhand, he modified his 
views in this respect in the light of the experiences that led to, or constituted, his 
liberation. All this, I repeat, is speculation. But the second possibility shows that it is 
not guaranteed that the Buddha continued here an earlier tradition. Historians of ideas 
have a tendency to look for antecedents, and they are right in doing so. But this 
tendency should not lead to a historiography of ideas which does no longer allow for 
new ideas to come into being. The Buddha's concept of karma may have been such a 
new idea, and the solution he offered to the problem of rebirth was almost certainly 




                                                
27 To be distinguished from mere mental activity, which — being one form of activity — also other 
religious movements, such as Jainism, tried to suppress. 
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